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Comment
GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT: ECHOES OF THE TRUMPET
Legal services, particularly defense in criminal cases, are not
like houses or automobiles where those with more money can buy
better products without affecting the basic functioning of society.
When one defendant cannot afford a complete defense justice is
rationed.
... There is no question that a man prepared to spend $500,-
000 is far more likely to retain his freedom than a man who can
afford only a few thousand dollars.
The amount of money which can be expended on defense
should not affect the outcome of the trial. If justice is priced in the
market place, individual liberty will be curtailed and respect for
law diminished.'
The concern Attorney General Kennedy expressed in this statement
has been shared for years by many members of the bar and laymen alike.
Regardless of one's feelings about the desirability of the states providing
counsel for a criminally accused indigent, there is no doubt that, at least
in federal cases, the sixth amendment requires that, "in all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall have the right.., to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defense."2 Some persons have felt that many of the questions
surrounding the provision of legal assistance to the indigent accused were
answered by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of
Gideon v. Wainwright,3 but subsequent developments in both federal and
state cases indicate that Gideon raised more problems than it solved.
The questions raised concern the applicability of the sixth amend-
ment guarantee, i.e., is it limited to federal prosecutions, to what offenses
does it apply, and at what stages of a criminal prosecution is counsel re-
quired. These are questions which, historically, did not particularly concern
the courts of this country, and only recently have the bench and bar become
cognizant of such issues. However, in 1963, in Gideon, the United States
Supreme Court made it dear that "[a]ny person hailed into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him. This seems to be an obvious truth."4
This comment, in exploring the indigent's right to appointed counsel,
will examine briefly the background of Gideon and the case itself, followed
by a survey of subsequent developments and attempt to delineate those
areas in which the law is dear as well as point out the troublesome areas
still awaiting judicial articulation.
1. R. F. Kennedy, JUDICIAL AD iNms ATION, FAIR AND EQuALTREATMENT To
ALL Brro-r THE L.W, 28 VrrAL SP rmEcs #23 at 706, 708 (1962).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (emphasis added).
(216)
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I. TBE LAW PRIOR TO GDON
As one writer has noted, "until the 'Scotsboro' case in 1932, the Su-
preme Court had not been concerned with the problem of counsel for indi-
gent defendants in criminal cases." 5 In that case, Powell v. AlabamaA the
Supreme Court held that, in a capital case, failure to appoint counsel for an
indigent state defendant was a violation of fourteenth amendment due
process.7 Johnson v. Zerbst,s a 19-38 federal case, held that:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged
with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this consti-
tutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a
federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.9
Thus, in federal felony cases, capital or not, a defendant has since 1938
been entitled to representation by counsel, and the court need not look past
a mere lack of representation to find a due process denial; sixth amend-
ment applicability to federal courts made judgments against unrepresented
defendants void.
This rule was held not to apply to state court prosecutions in Betts v.
Brady,lo decided in 1942. The Court held that the sixth amendment was
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, and that only
when "special circumstances," i.e., a capital offense, were present, were
state courts bound to provide counsel for an indigent.11 Justice Black, joined
by Justices Douglas and Murphy, dissented, but Betts became the law and
stood, subject to gradual erosion,12 until 1963.
II. GIDEON V. WAINWRiGHT 3
Clarence Gideon's prosecution by the state of Florida for burglary,
beginning with the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel to represent him,
5. Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 VA. L. Rrv.
1150, 1151 (1963).
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7. [I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel,
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignor-
ance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy or the like, it is the duty of the court,
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite
of due process of law. Id. at 71 (1932).
In discussing Powell, Beaney states that the case,[i]f read in its narrowest sense, holds that in a capital case where defend-
ants are young, illiterate, inexperienced, and subject to intense local hos-
tility, failure to make an effective (rather than formal) appointment of
counsel is a denial of due process. The overtones of the Powell opinion,
however, suggest a more general rule, particularly in Mr. Justice Suther-
land's broad and sympathetic treatment of the plight of uncounseled
criminal defendants.
Beaney, supra note 5, at 1153.
8. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
9. Id. at 467.
10. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
11. Id.
12. From the mid-1950's on, it became more and more edivent that in
the process of finding exceptions to the Betts non-appointment rule the
court was destroying the rule itself... By 1963 the pretense of 'the Rule
of Betts v. Brady' had become too thin to be maintained.
Beaney, supra note 5, at 1153.
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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led to one of the most significant constitutional decisions by the United
States Supreme Court in recent years.14 Gideon laid the groundwork for the
expansion of the indigent's right to representation by counsel in criminal
prosecutions at any "critical stage."'Ir The overruling of Betts removed
any doubt that the sixth amendment right to counsel is applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. While
that proposition may seem simple enough, the development of the law
since Gideon makes it obvious that the Court's meaning was not completely
clear.
III. RIGHT To COUNSEL: FOR WHAT?
One question not answered by Gideon is whether persons charged with
lesser offenses have a right to counsel concommitant with that of accused
felons. In certain state courts, misdemeanors have been held to be within
the purview of the sixth amendment, but several approaches have been
taken and no definitive limits have been drawn.'
14. For an in depth view of the Gideon case, including the trial and the out-
standing work of Abe Fortas as counsel on appeal, see A. Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet
(1964).
15. See Section III infra.
16. Some states have spelled out the right to counsel in offenses classified as
less than felonies. California, In re Lopez, 2 Cal.3d 141, 465 P.2d 257, 84 Cal. Rptr.
361 (1970); In re Smiley, 66 Cal.2d 606, 427 P.2d 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967);
Oregon, Application of Stevenson, 458 P.2d 414 (Ore. 1969); Minnesota, (This
state applies the right to counsel to all criminal cases where any jail term is pos-
sible). State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1967); State v. Collins, 154 N.W.2d
688 (Minn. 1967); State v. Illingsworth, 154 N.W.2d 687 (Minn. 1967).
Other state courts have adopted the federal standard for determining when
appointment of counsel is necessary. This is the "petty" versus "serious" offense
rule of 18 U.S.C. § 1.
(3) Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprison-
ment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than 5500, or both,
is a petty offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 300 6A requires than counsel be made available to indigent criminal
defendants charged in federal courts with anything but a "petty" offense: Arizona,
Burrage v. Superior Court, 1905 Ariz. 53, 459 P.2d 313 (1969). The court adopted
the federal rule and even allowed discretion by the trial court to provide counsel
in some less severe cases; Florida, State v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1970), where
the court would require appointment of counsel if the offense is punishable by
more than six months in jail. Massachusetts, MacDonnell v. Commonwealth, 230
N.E.2d 821 (Mass. 1967) (requirement implied); North Carolina, 8 N.C. App. 234,
174 S.E.2d 8 (1969); State v. Batiste, 5 N.C. App. 511, 168 S.E.2d 510 (1969); State
v. Sims, 5 N.C. App. 288, 168 S.E.2d 239 (1969); State v. Norris, 275 N.C. 50, 165
S.E.2d 245 (1969); Wisconsin, State v. Department of Health and Social Services,
37 Wis. 713, 155 N.W.2d 549 (1968). The court adopted at least the six month
portion of the federal rule and seemingly extended it to give more flexibility to
allow appointment:
[I]n such other cases in which the trial court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, deems it necessary and desirable in order to attain the best
interests of justice. Id. at 725, 155 N.W.2d at 555 (1968).
Some states, however, take the position that there simply is no right to counsel
on a misdemeanor charge: Illinois, People v. Dupree, 240 N.E.2d 414 (II. 1968),
where the court said that there is no right to counsel unless a possibility of a jail
sentence exists. Louisiana, State v. Rocheymore, 253 La. 101, 216 So.2d 829 (1968);
[Vol. 86
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The United States Supreme Court declined to settle the question when,
just a little more than a month after Gideon, it decided Patterson v.
Warden.17 The defendant was charged in a Maryland court with violation
of a state statute' 8 prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon and
with violating a Baltimore city ordinance.19 The Maryland Code dearly
denominated the statutory violation a misdemeanor,20 and, of course, the
municipal violation was not a felony. The Maryland Court of Appeals af-
firmed Patterson's conviction at a trial without counsel. 21 On certiorari,
the Supreme Court of the United States merely vacated the judgment and
remanded the case, without opinion, "for further consideration in light of
Gideon v. Wainwright."22 On rehearing, the Maryland Court of Appeals
decided that, in light of Gideon, Patterson was denied his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel, reversed his conviction, granted him a new trial,
"and ordered further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright."28
Conceivably the Maryland court, after further consideration, could
have found that even "in the light of Gideon" defendant was not entitled
to representation by counsel. The wording of the Supreme Court opinion
certainly did not require a decision favorable to Patterson. Of course, such
a decision might well have been reversed again by the Supreme Court as
it was on Patterson's prior trip there,24 but other cases do not necessarily
support that conclusion.
In several state court cases decided after Patterson in which the issue
of right to counsel on charges less than felonies was raised the Court denied
certiorari, thus leaving the state court's refusal to grant counsel standing.2 5
The Supreme Court was apparently not saying, however, that there was no
right to counsel on lesser charges, at least in all cases, as is evidenced by the
progress of one of the cases, Beck v. Winters.26 In this case the Arkansas
conviction of a black man for "immorality" under a Little Rock city ordi-
nace was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas.2 7 The United States
State v. Angelo, 251 La. 250, 203 So.2d 710 (1967); City of New Orleans v. Cook,
249 La. 820, 191 So.2d 634 (1966).
Other states seem to use the Betts "special circumstances" test. Arizona, In Bur-
rage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P.2d 313 (1969); Arizona adopted the
federal standard but allowed discretion on the part of the trial court to appoint
counsel in less than "serious" misdemeanors if the judge feels justice warrants it.
New Mexico, State v. Coates, 78 N.M. 366, 431 P.2d 744 (1967).
17. 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
18. Art. 27, CODE OF MD. § 36 (1957).
19. Art. 24, CoDE OF Crry OF BAIT. § 48 (1950).
20. Art. 27, CODE OF MD. § 36 (1957).
21. 227 Md. 194, 175 A.2d 746 (1961). The court held that the charges were
not "serious" despite the fact that the statutory violation carried a possible sentence
of two years imprisonment.
22. 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
23. Patterson v. Warden, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
24. Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
25. DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966); Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S.
907 (1966); Cortinez v. Flourney, 385 U.S. 925 (1966).
26. 395 U.S. 63 (1969).
27. Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965).
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Supreme Court denied certiorari 28 over a vigorous dissent by Justice Stewart.
Winters subsequently received relief through a habeas corpus proceeding
in federal district court. His case was remanded to the City of Little Rock
for a new trial after the federal court held that, in light of Gideon, Winters'
right to counsel had been violated.2 9 The state appealed to the Eight
Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the grant of the writ.30 On appeal
by the state, the United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari.3 1
This time the opposite result was reached.
No reason for the different approaches taken by the state and federal
courts in Winters was articulated. It seems to be merely a more liberal at-
titude by federal judges. It remains unexplained why the Supreme Court,
without hearing, denied certiorari in two inconsistent rulings.
While the Court has not yet chosen to spell out what degree of offense
brings into play the language of the sixth amendment requiring counsel for
"all criminal prosecutions," there may be an indication of the attitude of
the Court in Baldwin v. New York.32 Though the constitutional issue in
that case was not the right to counsel, it did involve an interpretation of
another part of the sixth amendment, i.e., the right to jury trial33
Baldwin was charged with "'jostling,' 3 4 a Class A misdemeanor in
New York, punishable by a maximum imprisonment of one year."3 5 He
was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and his conviction was af-
firmed by the New York Court of Appeals.38 The United States Supreme
Court, by a three man majority opinion,37 with two justices concurring3s
and three dissenting,3 9 reversed his conviction and held that any crime
which carries a possible maximum penalty of six months imprisonment is a
"serious" as opposed to "petty" offense, and the right to jury trial at-
taches. 40 Thus, the Court applied the federal standard of "serious" versus
"petty" offenses41 in determining whether there is a right to be tried by a
28. Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
29. Winters v. Beck, 281 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
30. Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969).
31. Beck v. Winters, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
32. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
33. Id.
34. Mr. Justice White, author of the majority opinion, stated in a footnote:
1. "Jostling is one of the ways in which legislatures have attempted to
deal with pickpocketing. See Denzer & McQuillan, Practice Commentary
N. Y. Penal Law § 165.25 (McKinney 1967); Pickpocketing: A Survey of
the Crime and its Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 408, 419 (1955). The New
York law provides:
"A person is guilty of jostling when, in a public place, he intention-
ally and unnecessarily:
1. Places his hand in the proximity of a person's pocket or handbag; or
2. Jostles or crowds another person at a time when a third person's hand
is in the proximity of such person's pocket or handbag." N. Y. Penal Law
§ 165.25 (McKinney 1967). Id. at 67.
35. Id. at 67.
36. Baldwin v. N.Y., 299 N.Y.S.2d 424, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 247 N.E.2d 260 (1969).
37. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall.
38. Justices Black and Douglas.
39. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Stewert.
40. Baldwin v. N.Y., 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
[Vol. 36
5
Dyer: Dyer: Gideon V. Wainwright
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
COMMENT
jury. Logic would seem to dictate that an analogy can be drawn between
the Baldwin holding and the right to counsel. The two rights arise out of
the same amendment, and some states have already used the federal formula
for determining to what offenses the right to counsel attaches. 42 However,
there is reason to doubt the validity of such an analogy. In the first place, at
the time of the Baldwin decision, New York City was the only place in the
United States where a defendant would not have been entitled to a jury
trial for the offense with which he was charged.43 Thus, the case did not
involve a far reaching change but merely brought one city in line with the
rest of the nation.44 The effect of extending this holding by analogy to the
right to counsel would be much more sweeping. Also, in the past, the
Court has shown an unwillingness to find conclusively what offenses are
within the purview of the right to counsel provision,45 and it is question-
able whether the court will deal broadly with the issue or continue to ex-
amine the facts of particular cases. Arguably, however, Baldwin expresses a
willingness to give finality to the question in one area, thus making it more
likely the court will, given the opportunity, deal with it in another. A
closely related practical problem is that the previous unwillingness of the
Court to attack the issue might make prospective appellants hesitant to
expend the necessary time and money to perfect an appeal to the Supreme
Court to seek reversal of minor sentences.
Finally, it should be noted that Justices Black and Douglas would give a
strict and literal reading to the United States Constitution, i.e., "criminal
prosecutions" means all criminal prosecutions, and the right to be tried
by a jury exists under any criminal charge.46 If this approach were to be
42. See supra, note 16 and text.
43. The Court discusses the fact that when Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145(1968) was decided, only three jurisdictions did not provide jury trial when the
penalty exceeded six months. The three included: Louisiana, whose procedure was
struck down in Duncan; one particular statutory violation in New Jersey (dis-
orderly conduct) which was changed so that the penalty was scaled down to six
months and $500; and New York City. Justice White stated:
In the entire Nation, New York City alone denies an accused the right
to interpose between himself and a possible prison term of over six months,
the common sense judgment of a jury of his peers. Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66, 71-72, (1970).
Justice Harlan, however, in an appendix to his dissent in Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. at 141-43 (1970), lists 6 states in which a misdemeanant was not entitled to ajury at his initial trial.
44. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
45. See notes 28-36 supra, and text.
46. "[The Constitution itself guarantees a jury trial 'in all criminal prose-
cutions' and 'in all crimes."' Mr. Justice Black goes on to discuss past judicial de-
cisions which limit the right to a jury trial to "serious" offenses and then concludes:
Such constitutional adjudication, whether framed in terms of
'fundamental fairness,' 'balancing,' or 'shocking and conscience,'
amounts in every case to little more than judicial mutilation of
our written Constitution. Those who wrote and adopted our
Constitution and Bill of Rights engaged in all the balancing nec-
essary. They decided that the value of a jury trial far outweighed
its costs 'in all crimes' and '[i]n all criminal prosecutions.' Until
that language is changed by the constitutionally prescribed
method of amendment, I cannot agree that this Court can re-
1971]
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adopted by a majority of the court, it would obviate the need for the petty-
serious distinction and Baldwin's six month demarcation.
At present, there is no definitive answer as to when the defendant in a
state court is entitled to have appointed counsel prepare his case. One can
only speculate that Baldwin does give some indication of the feeling and
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court on sixth amendment ques-
tions.
IV. RlGHT To COUNSEL: WEN?
A. The United States Supreme Court and Right to Counsel
1. The Critical Stage
The confusion centering around the gravity of the offense necessary
for the right to counsel to exist is equaled by that concerning the determina-
tion of the point in the criminal process at which the right to counsel at-
taches and when an accused must be informed of his right. The Supreme
Court has said that "[t]he plain wording of this guarantee thus encom-
passes counsel's assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful 'de-
fence'."47 In delineating when counel is "necessary," and required, the
court has said at the "critical stage." 48 Further, the Court has set itself the
duty of determining on review whether denial of counsel came at a critical
stage:
In some, the principal of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases
requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the ac-
cused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is neces-
sary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected
by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against
him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.
It calls upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice
to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and
the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. 49
While it may seem that the Court has laid down a definitive test-one
which prosecutors, trial courts, and state appellate courts could interpret in
light of a given situation and use effectively to predict what would happen
assess the balance and substitute its own judgment for that em-
bodied in the Constitution. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66,
75 (1970), (concurring opinion).
The argument advanced by Mr. Justice Black concerning balancing the costs is
given support in a footnote to the majority opinion wherein Mr. Justice White
states:
Experience in other States, notably California where jury trials are avail-
able for all criminal offenses including traffic violations, Cal. Pen Code
§ 689 (1956), suggests that the administrative burden is likely to be slight,
with a very high waiver rate of jury trials. Id. at 74, n.22.
Of course, it may be questionable whether as many persons would waive the right
to counsel as would the right to a trial by jury. If so, Mr. Justice Black's argument
is left to stand on its own constitutional merits without the benefit of empirical data
concerning results in practice.
47. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967).
48, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
49. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
[Vol. 36
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should a case reach the United States Supreme Court-the line of cases in
which the Court has applied the "critical stage" test and the confusion
among state cases make it evident that such is not the case.
2. Arraignment As a Critical Stage
As early as 1982, the critical nature of "the time of ... arraignment
until the beginning of... trial,"50 was recognized in Powell v. Alabama.51
Two years prior to Gideon, in 1961, the Court set the period back one step.
In that case, Hamilton v. Alabama,52 a black man was sentenced to death
for two counts of burglary.53 The Supreme Court, with Mr. Justice Doug-
las writing for the majority, held that "[a]rraignment under Alabama law
is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding."5 4 Douglas went on, seemingly,
to amplify the "critical stage" test:
What happens there may affect the whole trial. Available defenses
may be as irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they
are when an accused represented by counsel waives a right for
strategic purposes.55
The particular language in which the Court chose to couch its ruling
can leave the impression that it was saying that there could be instances
where an arraignment was not a critical stage of the prosecution. This in-
dication comes from the use of the words "under Alabama law."56 In other
words, if it were not possible to "irretrievably" lose "defenses," and rights
would not be prejudiced or waived, then this stage might not be critical
in other states. Some courts apparently received that impression and held
that the arraignment was not a "critical stage." 57 Other state courts, how-
ever, have taken the opposite approach and held this stage critical.58
50. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1982).
51. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court stated:
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings... arraign-
ment until... trial... they were entitled to such [counsel] during that
period as at the trial itself. Id. at 57.
52. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
53. Id. Defendant was charged on two counts, breaking and entering with
intent to steal, and breaking and entering a dwelling at night with intent to ravish.
54. Id. at 53.
55. Id. at 54.
56. Id. at 58.
57. Kentucky, Collins v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.2d 668 (Ky. 1968). The
court distinguished Hamilton, indicating that the arraignment was not a critical
stage because the trial court has discretion to allow withdrawal of any waivers made
at the arraignment. Maryland, Ewing v. Warden, 4 Md. App. 716, 244 A.2d 902
(1968). This case was seemingly qualified by the proviso that the arraignment is not
"critical" if no guilty plea is made. Michigan, People v. Sharp, 9 Mich. App. 34,
155 N.W.2d 719 (1967). Here the court indicated that counsel was not necessary at
arraignment unless the defendant expressed a desire to plead guilty. New Jersey,
State v. Smith, 109 N.J. Super. 9, 262 A.2d 45 (1970). Here again the court seemed
to feel the "critical" nature issue turns on what defendant does, not what he could
do. In other words, if he pleads not guilty, then the arraignment is not a critical
stage.
58. Alabama, Strickland v. State, 189 So.2d 771 (Ala. 1965). Of course, this
recognition makes little difference following the holding of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Hamilton. Florida, Machwart v. State, 222 So.2d 38 (Fla. App. 1969);
1971]
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8. Preliminary Hearing As a Critical Stage
Depending on the particular procedure used by a state in its criminal
process, it may or may not appoint counsel for an indigent defendant at the
preliminary hearing. 50 The Supreme Court's holding in White v. Mary-
land,0 0 in 1963, moved the "critical stage" test back one step to encompass
that hearing.61
White was charged with murder and at a preliminary hearing where
he was not represented by counsel, he pleaded guilty. His plea was later
changed to "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity" at his ar-
raignment, where he was represented by counsel. At trial, the plea of
guilty made at the preliminary hearing was entered into evidence against
defendant, and he was convicted by a jury of the murder charges.6 2 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed his conviction, contending that
Hamilton v. Alabama,0 did not apply, and that the lower court was not
required to appoint counsel for defendant at the hearing as it was not
necessary for him to enter any plea at that time.64
The United States Supreme Court saw the matter in an entirely dif-
ferent light, holding "that Hamilton v. Alabama governs and.., the judg-
ment.., is reversed."0 5 Further, the Court in its per curiam opinion made
it dear that:
Whatever may be the normal function of the 'preliminary hearing'
under Maryland Law, it was in this case as 'critical' a stage as ar-
Sardina v. State, 168 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1964); Evans v. State, 163 So.2d 520 (Fla. App.
1964); King v. State, 157 So.2d 440 (Fla. App. 1963). New York, People v. Shelly,
28 App. Div.2d 728, 281 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967); People v. Turchiarelli, 26 App. Div.2d
898, 274 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1966). The court, in one case, seemed to indicate that
counsel must be provided even prior to arraignment where it is delayed to give the
police time to get a statement from the defendant. People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162,
227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 182 N.E.2d 103 (1962).
59. See G. Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing-Better Alternatives Or More
of the Same, 35 Mo. L. Riv. 281, 285-86 (1970). In the footnotes to his article
Professor Anderson thoroughly discusses the procedural approaches used by various
states and the rights given the accused:
18. By 1980, at least 32 states permitted the accused to have assistance of
counsel at the hearing. ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDUE, 279-80 (1980)
(statutes only). By 1969, all states except Maryland, Mississippi, and Rhode
Island specifically permitted the accused to have counsel at the hearing,
by statute, court rule, or case law. Maryland, Mississippi, and Rhode Island
require prosecution by indictment in felony cases.
19. In 1980, apparently no state required appointment of counsel to
assist an indigent accused at the hearing. Id. By 1969, at least 14 states
required such appointment unless the hearing or the right to counsel is
waived: California, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, New
Jersey, Nevada, New York, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont,
and Wyoming.... Id. at 285, nn. 18-19.
60. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
61. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), had applied the "critical stage'"
test to the arraignment. See notes 50-58 supra and text. In White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59 (1963) counsel was provided for defendant at arraignment, but not at the
preliminary hearing held a month earlier.
62. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
63. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
64. White v. State, 227 Md. 615, 177 A.2d 877 (1962).
65. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
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raignment under Alabama law. For petitioner entered a plea be-
fore the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had
no counsel.06
Thus, under Maryland procedure, the accused was afforded the right
to counsel at his preliminary hearing if he entered a plea at that time; but
since the Court seemed to limit its holding to the state in question and its
procedure, further application of the White doctrine was questionable
until the Court more fully amplified its position in 1970 in Coleman v.
Alabama.67 Defendants were convicted in an Alabama court of assault with
intent to murder. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court two is-
sues were raised, the second of which was whether the "preliminary hear-
ing," at which the state failed to provide the defendants with counsel, was
a "critical stage" of the prosecution at which the defendants were entitled
to counsel.8s The court answered the question affirmatively, but remanded
the case to let the state court determine whether the denial of counsel was
harmless error.69
The period following White v. Maryland showed that the Court's
opinion was subject to narrow construction, as some states apparently felt
the case did not apply to them70 while others did supply counsel at the pre-
liminary hearing.7 1 Coleman should end any confusion on this point.
66. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
67. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
68. Id. The defendants also contended that the line-up in which they were
placed was conducted "[I3n circumstances so unduly prejudicial and conducive to
irreparable misidentification as to fatally taint [the witness's] in court identifica-
tions ... " Id. at 4.
69. That inquiry in the first instance should more properly be made by
the Alabama courts. The test to be applied is whether the denial of counsel
at the preliminary hearing was harmless error under Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 18, 87 (1967). Id. at II.
70. Arizona, State v. Chambers, 100 Ariz. 368, 414 P.2d 742 (1966), at least
not critical if defendants rights are not prejudiced in the particular hearing; State
v. Smith, 99 Ariz. 106, 407 P.2d 74 (1965). Kansas, Craig v. State, 198 Kan. 39, 422
P.2d 955 (1967); Smith v. State, 196 Kan. 438, 411 P.2d 663 (1966). Kentucky,
Turner v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1966); Commonvealth v. Watkins,
398 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1966); Yates v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1965);
Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964). It should be noted that, by
1969, Kentucky did require the appointment of counsel at a preliminary hearing.
See G. Anderson, supra note 59 at 285 n. 19; Maryland, Hartley v. State, 4 Md. App.
450, 243 A.2d 665 (1968); Airington v. Warden of Maryland Penetentiary, 232 Md.
672, 195 A.2d 38 (1963). Apparently the Maryland courts gave White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963), the narrow reading suggested as a possibility in text supra, at
note 64. Missouri, State v. McClain, 404 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. 1966); State v. Engberg,
391 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1965); State v. Small, 386 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1965); State v.
Phelps, 884 S.W.2d 616 (Mo. 1964); State v. McMillan, 383 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1964);
State v. Worley, 383 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1964); State v. Gagullarritti, 377 S.W.2d 298
(Mo. 1964); State v. Turner, 353 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1962). Pennsylvania, Common-
wealth v. Moroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A.2d 230 (1966); at least it is not a "critical
stage" absent a showing of unusual circumstances. Hobbs v. Russell, 420 Pa. 1,
215 A.2d 858 (1966). Tennessee, State v. Heer, 218 Tenn. 338, 408 S.W.2d 310(1966), particularly since defendant pleaded not guilty; Virginia, Via v. Peyton,
208 Va. 387, 158 S.E.2d 127 (1967).
71. For those states that required the appointment of counsel for a preliminary
hearing in 1969, see G. Anderson supra, note 59, at 285, n. 19. Professor Anderson
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Given the terms of Justice Brennan's opinion for the court,7 2 it is dear that
a preliminary hearing, wherever it is held, is a "critical stage" of the prose-
cutorial process and requires the appointment of counsel.7 3
4. Right to Counsel and Self-Incrimination
There is a close link between the sixth amendments guarantee of
right to counsel and the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimina-
tion; this is evident in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Escobedo v. Illinois7 4 and Miranda v. Arizona.7 5
Danny Escobedo was arrested for murder and later released. He was
rearrested, and, after repeated denials of his requests to see his attorney, he
made a confession which was later introduced against him at his trial7 6
After a reversal of Escobedo's conviction and a subsequent rehearing on re-
quest of the state, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed his conviction.77
After examining the facts of the case, the United States Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Goldberg, held:
[t]hat when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-
when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a con-
fession-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the
circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with
his lawyer.7 8
Thus, when an accused is to be interrogated by the police, and wishes
to have his counsel present, his request cannot be denied because custodial
interrogation is a critical stage of the criminal process. But more impor-
tanty, does the state have an affirmative duty to make counsel available?
The Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona,7 9 provided the answer. The
Court, in finding a denial of constitutional protections under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments, issued the following mandate:
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation
must be dearly informed that he has the right to consult with a
lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation...
this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.8 0
points out that the following states had the requirement: California, Delaware,
aho, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, New Mexico,
Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming
72. "Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential
to protect the indigent accused against an erronous or improper prosecution."
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970). Justice Brennan went on to list the
functions of defense counsel at a preliminary hearing and the importance of his
presence in the preparation of a defense.
73. Id. See also G. Anderson, note 59 supra at 285 n. 19, where the author
concludes that "Coleman v. Alabama... clearly requires appointment of counsel
for the hearing."
74. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
75. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479-83 (1964).
77. People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill.2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
78. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
79. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
80. Id. at 471. The Court reversed not only Miranda, but the companion
cases, Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S. 436, 494 (1966); and Westover v. U.S., 384 U.S.
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After Escobedo and Miranda it is evident that when an accused is in
custody, and the police interrogate him, this is a "critical stage" in the
criminal prosecution.8 '
5. The Line-Up As a Critical Stage
In United States v. Wade8 2 the Supreme Court focused its attention on
the "line-up" stage, where an accused is subjected to identification pro-
cedures. The specific problem in Wade was not that defendant was not
appointed counsel, but that a line-up was held without notification of
his attorney. At his trial Wade was identified by two witnesses who, on
cross-examination, told of a prior identification at a line-up.88 Wade's con-
viction on the charge of bank robbery was reversed by the Court of Appeals
of the Fifth Circuit.8 4 The Supreme Court, reversed, indicating that the
wrong test had been utilized in determining the propriety of admitting the
identifications, 85 and remanded the case to the district court for a deter-
mination of whether Wade's constitutional rights had been prejudiced.8 6
The Court held that the line-up itself did not violate the fifth amendment
436, 495 (1966). The Court affirmed the Supreme Court of California's reversal of
a conviction in California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966). In examining
Tignera, the Court found no evidence that any warning of the right to remain
silent was given to the defendant, and in fact, when the question was asked on
cross-examination of the police detective who had testified as to Vignera's con-
fession, an objection was sustained. 384 U.S. 436, 493-94 (1966); The defendant in
Westover was interrogated first by the Kansas City police and then the F.B.I. The
total in custody time prior to the confession was fourteen hours and Westover was,
"[i]nterrogated at length during that period." Even though, "the F.B.I. agents
gave warnings at the outset of their interview," 384 U.S. 436, 496 (1966); the
Kansas City police apparently gave more, and the Court pointed out:
There is no evidence of any warning given prior to the FBI interrogation
nor is there any evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI
commenced its interrogation. Id.
The Court looked to the benefit accruing to the F.B.I. from the "[p]ressure ap-
plied by the local in-custody interrogation," in deciding that under "[t]hese cir-
cumstances the giving of warnings alone was not sufficient to protect the privilege."
Id. at 497. In Stewart the Court affirmed a prior reversal of the conviction of the
defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the California Court that Esco-
bedo was applicable and that that court's determination was correct. Id. at 498.
81. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
82. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
83. Id. at 220.
84. U.S. v. Wade, 358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1966).
85. The Court felt that, while the denial of counsel at the line-up was un-
constitutional, if the in-court identification by the witness was sufficiently based
on factors other than the witness's seeing defendant at the line-up, i.e., an inde-
pendent identification, the evidence was admissible notwithstanding the denial of
the sixth amendment right to counsel. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963). Also, the Court added that the harmless error issue should be
considered:
mhe appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction
pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had
an independent source, or whether, in any event, the introduction of the
evidence was harmless error, Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S.
18.... 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967).
86. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 243 (1967).
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privilege against self-incrimination,87 but, nevertheless, the pretrial line-
up for identification purposes was a "critical stage" of the criminal prose-
cution and the sixth amendment right to counsel attached.88
The same day as Wade, the United States Supreme Court also decided
Gilbert v. State of California,9 applying the Wade test to reverse a con-
viction where in-court identifications may have been based on an uncon-
stitutional pretrial line-up. Also, the same day the court, in Stovall v.
Denno,90 refused to apply Wade and Gilbert retroactively.
6. Stages After Trial
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an accused
is entitled to the aid of counsel not only at trial, but at all pretrial "critical
stages." The remaining question is whether, once the jury verdict is in or a
guilty plea made, is there a continuing right to counsel?
The sentencing of a defendant who has entered a guilty plea was con-
sidered in Mempa v. Rhay9l in 1967, where a state prisoner's habeas corpus
petition claimed he was wrongfully imprisoned following revocation of his
probation. He had been placed on probation following a guilty plea to a
"joyriding" charge.92 Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated
the issue as a "question of the extent of the right to counsel at the time of
sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation."93
The Court looked to cases prior to Gideon,94 and then stated that when
those cases are re-examined in the light of Gideon:
[They] clearly stand for the proposition that appointment of coun-
sel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceed-
ing where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected. 95
Mr. Justice Marshall applied this rule and pointed out that, "certain
legal rights may be lost if not exercised at this stage,"98 and finally held
"[a] lawyer must be afforded at this proceeding whether it be labeled a
revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing."97 Thus, the right to
counsel extends past the actual trial stage at least until the accused is sen-
tenced.98 Although there are no Supreme Court cases declaring the appli-
87. Id. at 221.
88. Id. at 236-87.
89. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
90. 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967). The Court stated "that on the facts of this case
petitioner was not deprived of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Thus Theodore Stovall's death sentence was affirmed applying the
test of Powell v. Alabama. See note 7 supra.
91. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
92. Id. at 130.
93. Id.
94. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.
155 (1957); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736 (1948).
95. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 135.
97. Id. at 137.
98. But see McClain v. State, 448 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo. 1970), where the
Missouri Supreme Court indicated that defendant was not prejudiced by the fact
that counsel was not present at sentencing and could not offer for him mitigating
factors as to punishment because defendant had received the minimum sentence.
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cability of this rule to the former situation, i.e., a not guilty plea and trial,
there seems to be no basis for distinguishing them under the sixth amend-
ment.
Moving the inquiry further, what of a convicted indigent defendant's
right to counsel when he appeals his conviction? In dealing with this ques-
tion, the Court shifted its primary emphasis from the due process philosophy
of Gideon v. Wainwright to focus on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.99 Nine years prior to Gideon the Court had held in
Griffin v. Illinoisoo that, while an appeal was not a matter of right, once
a state granted an appeal it must be granted equally to rich and poor alike;
therefore, in order to effectively prepare an appeal, petitioner must be
furnished a transcript of the trial at state expense.101 Although the Court
mentioned due process, the primary thrust of the opinion, and its firmest
basis, was the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The actual question of the right to counsel on appeal was the subject of
Douglas v. California.10 2 The Court, through Mr. Justice Douglas, made it
dear that the decision was concerned only "with the first appeal, granted
as a matter of right to rich and poor alike"103 under California law. The
Court spoke in terms of equal protection rather than due process in holding
that counsel must be provided for the indigent appellant. Nowhere in the
majority opinion was there mention of Gideon. Justices Harlan and
Stewart took issue with the equal protection approach, pointing out that if
the Court's analysis were applied to right to counsel at trial, the method
of reasoning in Gideon was wholly unnecessary, and it could have easily
been decided on equal protection terms.104 Whether one agrees or dis-
agrees with the Douglas holding, dearly extending the right to counsel to
the appellate stage, or even with the application of the equal protection
approach, it does seem paradoxical to require a seemingly higher standard
for showing a right to counsel at trial and the earlier critical stages, than
after conviction when appeal is taken.105 This is meant in no way to
99. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. 351 U.S. 12 (1961).
101. Id. at 18. Mr. Justice Black's opinion makes it evident why the fact that
there is no absolute right to appellate review is a moot point today when he states,
"All of the states now provide some method of appeal from criminal convic-
tions.. ." Id. at 18.
102. 372 U.S. 358 (1968).
103. Id. at 356.
104. Id. at 368.
105. The higher standard stems from use of the "due process" approach re-
quiring the defendant to show that the denial of counsel will result in his rights
being prejudiced and thus that his denial came at a "critical stage." On the other
hand, to merely hold that, at a particular stage, if a person who can afford an
attorney's presence will be allowed to have him there then equal protection requires
the state to furnish counsel for an indigent, is a seemingly less strict standard. This
would appear to be the result of Douglas, whereas the cases concerning pretrial
"critical stages" use the "due process" approach. See footnotes 47-90 supra. One
other factor to be noted is that Douglas was decided in 1963, the same day as
Gideon, and not only did the majority opinion in Douglas not mention Gideon,
but the later cases dealing with pretrial "critical stages" take the "due process"
approach of Gideon, rather than the "equal protection" approach.
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criticize the result or opinion in Douglas, but perhaps it would be desirable
to re-examine Gideon, if the situation arises, and place the right to coun-
sel at trial and earlier critical stages on the basis of equal protection, thus
putting all defendants on an equal basis.
B. State Courts and the Right to Counsel
As previously noted, the courts of the various states tend to disagree
as to the gravity of the offense necessary to require appointment of coun-
sel. 10 6 As to what is a critical stage, there is also a lack of conformity and
agreement. 107 While many states have expressly acknowledged the binding
effect of Gideon on their criminal procedures, 0s the application in given
cases may vary. However, at least in certain areas, the mandate from the
United States Supreme Court should make it clear that, in fact, cer-
tain stages of the criminal process are "critical," and the right to coun-
sel exists. The effect of Supreme Court rulings on interrogation
at an accusatory stage,' 09 arraignment,"10 preliminary hearings,"' trial,112
sentencing,"13 and the appellate stage"14 has been discussed, and the
rulings that these are critical stages should be dear. While the effect
on state held line-ups and identification procedures may not be quite so
clearly outlined,"15 here too, if a defendant is likely to lose or irretriev-
ably waive rights critical to his effective defense at trial, the right to coun-
sel attaches. Thus, courts desiring effectively to protect the right of indi-
gent criminal defendants to be represented by counsel at every "critical
stage" of the prosecution should be able to reach that result.
V. CONCLUSION
Nearly a decade has elapsed since the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright. The questions of what is
an offense to which Gideon applies and what is a "critical stage" have been
106. See note 16 supra.
107. See note 70 supra.
108. E.g., California, People v. Bourland, 247 Cal. App.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 357
(1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1967); Idaho, Bement v. State, 422 P.2d 55 (Ida-
ho 1966); Kansas, Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 453 P.2d 35 (1969); Maryland,
Moore v. State, 7 Md.App. 330, 254 A.2d 717 (1969); Michigan, People v. Steams,
380 Mich. 704, 158 N.W.2d 409 (1968); Missouri, State v. Martin, 411 S.W.2d 215(Mo. 1967); Montana, State v. Lucero, 151 Mont. 531, 445 P.2d 731 (1968); North
Dakota, Smith v. Woodley, 164 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1969); New Mexico, State v.
Carrothers, 79 N.M. 347, 443 P.2d 517 (1968); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v.
Ritchey, 431 Pa. 269, 245 A.2d 446 (1968); South Carolina, State v. Cowart, 251 S.C.
360, 162 S.E.2d 535 (1968); Texas, Steel v. State, 453 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App. 1970).
109. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
110. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
111. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963).
112. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
113. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
114. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956).
115. See notes 82-90 supra, and text.
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argued before the United States Supreme Court, state and federal appellate
courts, and the trial courts of both.
The foregoing discussion makes it evident that neither of these ques-
dons has been conclusively answered in the years since Gideon. However,
the Supreme Court has provided guidelines in some areas which will make
the job of lower courts, prosecuting and defense attorneys, and police
easier.
If there is one development that could become significant in the fu-
ture, it is the shift away from due process and toward equal protection
suggested by Griffin v. Illinois 16 and Douglas v. California.117 If equal
protection were substituted as the ground requiring representation by coun-
sel for indigent defendants, it would eliminate the basis for the "petty-
serious" distinction, and eliminate any need to determine what is a
"critical stage" of the prosecution. The only question then would be
whether a lack of representation for indigent defendants desiring counsel
is a denial of equal protection of the law. Stated another way, if the af-
fluent defendant can be represented by counsel, then the state must provide
counsel for the indigent defendant.
Although this is the approach that seems to this writer to be most fair
and just, as well as providing a simple answer to the questions raised by
Gideon, there is no present indication that the Supreme Court will adopt
it.
There are, no doubt, those who will say to do so would place a heavy
financial burden on the governments, state and federal, although there is
evidence that it would not;118 but even so, it seems hard to justify the
placing of a price on constitutional rights.119
The full application of the equal protection approach has been
discussed already in the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan in Douglas v.
California:
The short way to dispose of Gideon v. Wainwright . . .would be
simply to say that the State deprives the indigent of equal protec-
116. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
117. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
118. It is apparent that the cost of a large-scale extension of the indigent's
right to counsel, while costly both in terms of men and money, may not
be as prohibitive, as some may have assumed. There are seemingly the re-
sources available for counsel to be extended . .. to all .. . indigent
felony defendants.
55 Iowa L. REv. 1249, 1267 (1970). However, as to the exact amount necessary to
provide all criminally charged indigents with counsel the author goes on to point
out, "[U]ntil a greater extension of counsel is attempted by the courts and legis-
latures, it will be impossible to determine what the actual effect of such an extension
of the right to counsel will be." Id. Cf. contra, State v. McCormick, 426 S.W.2d 62
(Mo. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
119. A literal application of this approach would require an extremely large
financial burden on society. Practically speaking, rich defendants will be more
likely to retain their freedom because society will probably be reluctant to expend
the amount of money that would be required to make legal services for indigents
"equivalent," e.g., investigative staff, etc.
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tion whenever it fails to furnish him with legal services ... equiv-
alent to those that the affluent defendant can obtain.120
Whether this approach will ever be adopted is at best open to speculation.
However, if it were, it might provide a surer means to the worthwhile end
suggested at the outset by Attorney General Kennedy.
GARY S. DYER
120. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 363 (1963).
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